AbstractÐBecause of their shorter key sizes, cryptosystems based on elliptic curves are being increasingly used in practical applications. A special class of elliptic curves, namely, Koblitz curves, offers an additional, but crucial, advantage of considerably reduced processing time. In this article, power analysis attacks are applied to cryptosystems that use scalar multiplication on Koblitz curves. Both the simple and the differential power analysis attacks are considered and a number of countermeasures are suggested. While the proposed countermeasures against the simple power analysis attacks rely on making the power consumption for the elliptic curve scalar multiplication independent of the secret key, those for the differential power analysis attacks depend on randomizing the secret key prior to each execution of the scalar multiplication. These countermeasures are computationally efficient and suitable for hardware implementation.
F cryptographic systems are not designed properly, they may leak information that is often correlated to the secret key. Attackers who can access this leaked information are able to recover the secret key and break the cryptosystem with reasonable efforts and resources. In the recent past, attacks have been proposed that use the leaked side channel information, such as timing measurement, power consumption, and faulty hardware (see, for example, [15] , [16] , [20] , [17] , [5] , [3] ). These attacks are more related to the implementation aspects of cryptosystems and are different from the ones that are based on statistical properties of the cryptographic algorithms (i.e., differential and linear cryptanalysis attacks [1] , [18] , [2] ).
In [16] and [17] , Kocher et al. have presented attacks based on simple and differential power analysis (referred to as SPA and DPA, respectively) to recover the secret key by monitoring and analyzing the power consumption signals. As shown in Fig. 1 , the secret key is stored in a cryptosystem (e.g., a smart-card), which relies on an external power supply and the attacker has the ability to monitor the power consumption signals. Such signals can provide the attacker with useful side channel information that may eventually reveal the key. In [11] , Kelsey et al. show how little side channel information is needed by an attacker to break the cryptosystem. In [20] , Messerges et al. show how the side channel information can be maximized.
In order to implement a good cryptosystem, the designer needs to be aware of such threats.
In [21] , a number of power analysis attacks against smart-card implementations of modular exponentiation algorithms have been described. In [8] , power analysis attacks have been extended to elliptic curve (EC) cryptosystems, where both the SPA and the DPA attacks have been considered and a number of countermeasures, including private key randomization and EC point blinding, have been proposed. A number of methods to counteract power analysis attacks have also been reported in [7] .
In the recent past, for cryptographic applications, two classes of elliptic curves, namely random and Koblitz (a.k.a. anomalous binary) curves, have received considerable attention and specific parameters for these curves have been proposed by a number of organizations, such as NIST (the National Institute of Standards and Technology) [26] and SECG (the Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group) [6] . Cryptosystems based on Koblitz curves were proposed by Koblitz in [13] . Such cryptosystems offer significant advantage in terms of reduced processing time. The latter, along with shorter key sizes, has made Koblitz curve (KC) based cryptosystems quite attractive for practical applications. However, the existing countermeasures against power analysis attacks on random EC-based cryptosystems do not appear to be the best solution to KCbased cryptosystems.
In this paper, power analysis attacks and countermeasures in the context of KC-based cryptosystems are investigated. The SPA attack is considered and its countermeasures at the algorithmic level are given. The proposed countermeasures rely on making the power consumption for the elliptic curve scalar multiplication independent of the secret key. Cryptosystems equipped with such countermeasures are, however, not secure enough against a stronger attack based on the DPA. In this paper, we also consider the DPA attack and describe how an attacker can maximize the differential signal used for the power correlation. To prevent DPA attacks against KC cryptosystems, we suggest a number of countermeasures. These countermeasures depend on randomizing the secret key prior to each execution of the SPA resistant scalar multiplication. They are suitable for hardware implementation and, compared to the countermeasures available in the open literature, their implementation appears to be less complex. More importantly, it is shown that their use can attenuate the differential signal to a level which makes the DPA attack infeasible with technologies available today.
The organization of the remainder of this paper is as follows: The next section briefly introduces random and Koblitz elliptic curves and their group operations. Section 3 describes the simple power analysis attack, its countermeasures, and related trade-offs. The differential power analysis attack is discussed in Section 4. Also, the time and space requirements for the DPA attack and possible strategies that the attacker can use to strengthen the differential signal are presented in this section. The DPA countermeasures, along with their costs, are suggested in Section 5. Section 6 presents arguments regarding the protection provided by the proposed DPA countermeasures. Section 7 gives a comparison of a number of existing similar countermeasures with the ones proposed in this article. Finally, concluding remarks are made in Section 8.
PRELIMINARIES
An elliptic curve (EC) is the set of points satisfying a bivariate cubic equation over a field. For the finite field qpP n of characteristic two, the standard equation for an EC is the Weierstrass equation:
where Y P qpP n and T H. The points on the curve are of the form xY y, where x and y are elements of qpP n . Let i be the elliptic curve consisting of the solutions xY y to (1), along with a special point, y, called the point at infinity. It is well-known that the set of points on i forms a commutative finite group under the following addition operation. (More on it can be found in [22] , [14] , [19] , [24] , and [4] .)
Elliptic Curve Addition
Let xY y T y be a point on i. The inverse of is defined as À xY x y. The point y is the group identity, i.e., y y , where denotes the elliptic curve group operation (i.e., addition). If H x H Y y H T y and I x I Y y I T y are two points on i and H T À I , then the result of the addition H I P x P Y y P is given as follows:
The above formulas for the addition rule require a number of arithmetic operations, namely, addition, squaring, multiplication, and inversion over qpP n . (See, e.g., [23] and [28] , for efficient algorithms for finite field arithmetic.) The computational complexities of addition and squaring are much lower than those of multiplication and inversion. To simplify the complexity comparison, our forthcoming discussion in this article ignores the costs of addition and squaring operations. Also, note that the formulas in (2) and (3) for point doubling (i.e., H I ) and adding (i.e., H T I ) are different. The doubling requires one inversion, two general multiplications, and one constant multiplication, whereas the adding operation costs one inversion and two general multiplications. Since a field inverse is several times slower than a constant multiplication, we assume that the costs of elliptic curve point doubling and adding are roughly equal. If the points on i are represented using projective coordinates [4] , one can, however, expect to see a considerable difference in these two costs and needs to treat them accordingly.
Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication
Elliptic curve scalar multiplication is the fundamental operation in cryptographic systems based on ECs. If k is a positive integer and is a point on i, then the scalar multiplication k is the result of adding k copies of , i.e.,
Then, one may use the well-known double-and-add scheme to compute k in l iterations as follows:
Algorithm 1. Scalar multiplication by double-and-add scheme Input: and k Output: Remark 1. For practical purposes, one can assume that l n, where n is the dimension of the underlying extension field. Then, the above algorithm would require approximately QnaP elliptic operations on average.
Note that the conventional binary system is nonredundant and k has only one representation. However, using a different number system which has redundancy in it, the integer k can be represented in more than one way. By choosing a representation of k that has fewer nonzeros, one can reduce the number of EC additions and, hence, speed up the scalar multiplication. More on this can be found in [9] and the references therein.
Remark 2. If k is represented in the binary NAF (nonadjacent form [9] ), k j P fÀIY HY Ig and k j k jI H, H j n À I, then the average number of elliptic operations in Algorithm 1 is % RnaQ.
Koblitz Curves
In (1), if we set I and restrict to be in fHY Ig, we have
which gives a special class of ECs, referred to as Koblitz curves (KC). Let us denote the KC as i . (In the rest of this paper, if a curve i as defined in conjunction with (1) is not of Koblitz type, then it is referred to as a random curve.) In (4), since P qP if xY y is a point on i , x P Y y P is also a point on i . Using the addition rule given in the previous section, one can also verify that if xY y P i , then the three points, viz., xY y, x P Y y P , and x R Y y R , satisfy the following:
Using (5), one can then obtain
where ( is a complex number which satisfies
Equation (6) is referred to as the Frobenius map over GF (2) . One implication of (6) is that the multiplication of a point on i by the complex number ( can simply be realized with the squaring of the x and y coordinates of the point. In a normal basis representation, squaring is as simple as a cyclic shift of the bits of the operand. Efficient squaring algorithms using the more widely used polynomial basis can be found in [27] and [23] .
A more important feature of (6) is as follows: If the scalar k is represented with radix (, then, in the computation of k using Algorithm 1, the operation X P is replaced by X (. The latter corresponds to two squaring operations over qpP n and completely eliminates much more costly elliptic curve point doubling operations.
SPA ATTACK AND ITS COUNTERMEASURES
The elliptic curve scalar multiplication k , where both and are points on the curve and k is an integer of about n bits long, is the fundamental computation performed in cryptosystems based on elliptic curves. The security of elliptic curve cryptosystems depends on the difficulty of obtaining k from and . The integer k is often the private key and, in many applications, it is stored inside the cryptosystem. In the recent past, attacks have been reported in the open literature to recover the key by analyzing the power consumption of cryptosystems. Following [8] , here we first briefly describe the simple power analysis (SPA) attack and a countermeasure against it. Although the countermeasure, which is a close-variant of its counterpart in modular exponentiation, is easy to implement, below we show that its straightforward implementation gives away the computational advantage one would expect from the use of Koblitz curves. We then discuss two simple modifications for possible improvements.
SPA Attack
In general, power analysis attacks rely on the difference between power consumptions of the cryptosystem when the value of a specific partitioning function is above and below a suitable threshold. For example, when a cryptosystem is performing a simple operation (such as the Frobenius map), the power consumption may be related to the Hamming weight of the operand. Large differences in power consumptions may be identified visually or by simple analysis.
Consider a Koblitz curve-based cryptosystem which uses k as the secret key. The latter is an n bit integer, i.e., k nÀI iÀH k i P i with k i P fHY Ig. To take advantage of the simple Frobenius map in the computation of scalar multiplication, the key is converted into a (Edi representation (for conversion algorithms, the reader may refer to [25] ). Let us denote this representation as k lÀI iÀH i ( i . If we limit i to be 0 and 1 only, then l % Pn [25] .
The cryptosystem takes a point P i as input and computes k . For this computation, the cryptosystem uses Algorithm 1 (with k j and radix 2 replaced by j and (, respectively) and relies on an external power source, as shown in Fig. 2 . As shown in the figure, the operation X (, which corresponds to two simple squaring operations over qpP n , is performed in each iteration, irrespective of the value of j . However, the step with X is processed if j I, which requires a number of time and power consuming operations, such as qpP n multiplication and inversion, as shown in (2) and (3). This enables an attacker to easily analyze the power consumption signals, especially to detect the difference in power consumption (and time) and to eventually recover j . An attacker may need as few as one iteration of the scalar multiplication algorithm to obtain j .
Coron's Simple Countermeasure
A straightforward countermeasure for the SPA attack is to make the execution of the elliptic curve addition independent of the value of j . This can be achieved by performing the elliptic addition in each iteration, irrespective of the value of j , and using the sum in the subsequent steps as needed. This is shown in the following algorithm. In this algorithm, if radix ( is replaced by 2, we obtain the SPA resistant scalar multiplication for random elliptic curves proposed by Coron [8] .
Algorithm 2. SPA resistant scalar multiplication Input: and
Assuming that the difference in power consumption to access H and I is negligible, the power consumption for executing H X j (and, hence, the above algorithm) does not depend of the value of j . As a result, the simple power analysis attack would not be effective to recover k. Prior to implementing this algorithm, one should confirm such equal power consumptions on the target hardware.
In the above algorithm, for the (Edi representation of k, the loop will be executed approximately Pn times; hence, about Pn elliptic operations (only additions, no doubling) are needed. On the other hand, if the original binary representation of k is used, then the Frobenius map H X (H is to be replaced by H X PH and the loop will have only n passes; consequently, we need n additions and n doubling operations, or a total of Pn elliptic operations, assuming that the costs of point addition and doubling are approximately the same. Thus, Algorithm 2 does not appear to provide computational advantages to the Koblitz curves over random curves. The following discussion, however, attempts to alleviate this problem.
Reduced Complexity Countermeasure
Since the solutions (xY y) to (4) are over qpP n , we have x P n x. Consequently,
Thus, for the scalar multiplication k , instead of using k, one can use kmod ( n À I and an n-tuple can be used to represent k (mod (
, where i P . The latter corresponds to the set of symbols used for representing the reduced k. Efficient algorithms exist to reduce k modulo ( n À I (see, for example, [25] , [12] ). In certain situations, it appears to be advantageous to use an expanded symbol set which results in a redundant number system. Assume that fs H Y s I Y Á Á Á Y s jsjÀI g with s H`sI`Á Á Á`s jsjÀI . For the sake of simplicity, if we also assume that is symmetric around zero (e.g., fÀIY HY Ig), the following algorithm for k is SPA resistant.
Algorithm 2a. SPA resistant scalar multiplication with reduced ( representation Input: and
The cost of calculating the additive inverse of an elliptic point is simply equal to the addition of two elements of qpP n and it is quite small compared to an elliptic addition. As a result, the computational cost of the above algorithm is essentially njj À IaP elliptic operations (additions only). In terms of storage requirements, the above algorithm uses buffers to hold jj elliptic points. These buffers are accessed in each iteration. For high speed cryptosystems, these points can be buffered in the registers of the underlying processor. For practical applications, the number of registers needed for this purpose may be too high for many of today's processors. For example, if a Koblitz curve over qpP ITQ , recommended by various standardization committees, is used, then 12 32-bit registers are needed to hold a single elliptic point (both x and y coordinates in uncompressed form). Assuming that there are only three symbols in the set , the total number of 32-bit registers needed is 36.
Remark 3. If k is reduced mod ( n À I and represented in the signed binary (Edi form [9] , then the number of elliptic operations (i.e., additions) in Algorithm 2a is n.
In Table 1 , we summarize the important features of scalar multiplication using the algorithms described so far. The radix used for the representation of k is denoted by r. We also use a small sized symbol set suitable for resource constrained cryptosystems, such as smart-cards, which rely on external power supply. For Algorithm 1, we assume the use of the NAF for representing k, which helps to reduce the computational complexity. The NAF representation has almost no effect on the computational complexity of SPA resistant Algorithms 2 and 2a.
Countermeasure with a Large Sized Symbol Set
With the increase of jj, the cost of Algorithm 2a increases linearly and the advantage of using the Frobenius map over the point doubling diminishes. What follows below is a way to reduce the cost of scalar multiplication for Koblitz curves using a few precomputed elliptic curve points. Toward this end, for H j jj, one can compute s j and store it in a buffer labeled as s j . If the operation X ( j is performed n times with j being equal to n À IY Á Á Á Y IY H, then the final is the required k . With this approach, an SPA attack can, however, easily recover part of the secret key k. Specifically, when j H, we have X ( j ( y. Since the task of adding y is considerably simpler than that of any other point, the zeros in the secret key can be easily determined by detecting the difference in respective power consumptions. To alleviate this problem, hardware techniques can be used to hide the difference. What follows below, however, is a simple scheme which achieves the same goal with almost no hardware overhead.
From (8) , one can write
Thus, in the context of the scalar multiplication, one has
where s H is the smallest integer in . Notice that i À s H I ensures that each symbol of the reduced k representation is a nonzero positive integer. Now, we have an efficient way to compute scalar multiplication as follows:
Alborithm 2b. Efficient SPA resistant scalar multiplication with reduced ( representation Input: and kmod (
This algorithm requires a maximum of n jj elliptic operations (in contrast to njj À IaP elliptic operations in Algorithm 2a). More importantly, the number of registers needed in the main (i.e., second) loop of the above algorithm does not increase with the increase of the symbol set size. This may be advantageous for register constrained processors. The precomputed points, namely, i, for H i jj À I, can be stored in a RAM. The latter is updated at the beginning of the algorithm and is accessed only once in each iteration.
DPA ATTACK
SPA attacks would fail when the differences in the power signals are so small that it is infeasible to directly observe them and to apply simple power analysis. In such cases, an attacker can apply differential power analysis (DPA). Kocher et al. first introduced the idea of DPA to attack DES [16] , [17] . This DPA attack was strengthened by Messerges et al. in [20] . Coron applied the DPA attack against EC cryptosystems [8] . In this section, this attack is briefly described in the context of KC cryptosystems and its time and space requirements are given. Possible strategies that the attacker can use to strengthen the differential signal are presented.
DPA Attack on KC Scalar Multiplication
The DPA attacks are based on the same underlying principle as SPA attacks, but use statistical and digital signal processing techniques on a large number of power consumption signals to reduce noise and to strengthen the differential signal. The latter corresponds to the peak, if any, in the power correlation process. This signal is an indication of whether or not the attacker's guess about a symbol of the n-tuple representation of the secret key is correct.
Assume that a cryptosystem uses one of the SPA attack resistant scalar multiplication algorithms described in the previous section. In each of those algorithms, the representation of k (either (Edi or reduced (Edi) remains the same in all runs of the respective algorithm. The attacker can take advantage of this to recover the scalar in the DPA attack, as discussed below. For the sake of simplicity, assume that Algorithm 2, which is SPA resistant, is used for computing the scalar multiplication. Let lÀI Y Á Á Á Y I Y H ( , where i P fHY Ig for H i l À I, be the representation of the secret key k used in the algorithm. The attacker has knowledge of the algorithm and the symbol set to which the i s belong. In order to apply the DPA attack, the algorithm is executed repeatedly (say, t times) with points H Y I Y Á Á Á Y tÀI as inputs (see Fig. 3 ). During the execution of the algorithm, the power consumption is monitored for each iteration. For point i and the iteration where j is used, let iYj denote the power consumption signal monitored by the attacker. Note that Algorithm 2 uses lÀI in its first pass, then lÀP , and so on. The attacker's straightforward strategy is to determine these secret bits in the same order, i.e., first obtain lÀI , then lÀP , and so on. Assume that the most significant l À j H À I symbols, namely, lÀI Y lÀP Y Á Á Á Y j H I are known. In order to determine the next most significant symbol j H , the attacker proceeds as follows:
In an attempt to analyze the power signals, a partitioning function is chosen by the attacker. This function, in its simplest form, is the same for all j and is a two-valued logic. The function's value depends on k; more specifically, for j j H , it depends on lÀI Y lÀP Y Á Á Á Y j H . The true value, which is still unknown to the attacker, is generated within the cryptosystem which executes the scalar multiplication algorithm. Let us denote this value as iYj H P fHY Ig, H i t À I. For the DPA to work for the attacker, there ought to be a difference in the power consumptions based on the two values. By guessing a value (say H j H ) for j H , the attacker: 
and, for a sufficiently large value of t,
where is related to the difference in the average power consumptions with iYj H being 0 and 1. This nonzero value of the differential signal indicates a correct guess for j H . Instead of Algorithm 2, if Algorithm 2a or 2b is used, the representation of k will have n symbols, each belonging to the set . To obtain a nonzero differential signal, the attacker needs to try all symbols of , in the worst case, and jjaP symbols, on average. In the following, we assume that the cryptosystem under DPA attack uses Algorithm 2a or 2b.
Time and Space Requirements
Based on the above discussions, one can divide the task of the DPA attack into two phases. In phase I, the power consumption signals are monitored. The amount of time needed for this purpose is essentially the time to execute the scalar multiplication algorithm t times corresponding to the input points H Y I Y Á Á Á Y tÀI . In phase II, the power consumption signals are analyzed. Toward this effort, for the attacker's guess The DPA attack also requires memory space to store elliptic curve points and power consumption signals. For the calculation of H iYj s, the attacker needs to have t elliptic curve points stored in memory, where each such point, in the affine coordinate system and in uncompressed form, will require Pn bits. Additionally, the value of the differential signal relies on the power consumption signals. These signals may reside in the memory all at a time if phases I and II of the DPA attack do not overlap. In this case, the corresponding memory space requirement is ynt bits, where is the number of bits needed to represent a power signal. The attacker may reduce this space requirement to about yt bits by storing only t signals at a time. For example, to attack j , only HYj Y IYj Y Á Á Á Y tÀIYj are needed. These signals can be generated by executing the main loop of the scalar multiplication algorithm n À j times with input points H Y I Y Á Á Á Y tÀI , respectively. It is not difficult to see that such a reduced space requirement comes with a price of about nI P Efold increase in the power-consumption-signal monitoring time. The time and space complexities for the DPA attack can be stated as follows: Remark 4. Let n, , p, t, and be as defined above. Then, the DPA attack has a time complexity of yntpjj and its memory space requirement is ynt bits.
The values of n and jj depend on the cryptosystem under attack and cannot be typically controlled by the attacker. The value of can be close to the word size (i.e., 32 bits or so) of the processor used by the attacker. If two elliptic curve points are added to evaluate the partitioning function, then p can be approximated as yn P bit-level operations (i.e., logical AND, XOR, etc.). In order to reduce the time and space requirements, the attacker's possible strategy is to reduce t, i.e., to obtain the differential signal of sufficient strength with fewer power consumption signals.
Improving Differential Signal
The effectiveness of the DPA attacks depends on the attacker's ability to successfully generate the differential signal for the correct guess of the key symbols. The attacker attempts to maximize this signal in an effort to simplify the analysis on the monitored power signals. In [20] , a number of techniques, including noise reduction using digital filtering and signal magnification by multiple bit DPA, have been investigated which can maximize the differential signal. In [8] , this function is a specific bit of the intermediate point that the cryptosystem processes. The DPA relies on the assumption that there is a difference between power consumptions when that specific reference bit is 0 and 1.
The partitioning function plays an important role in determining the value of the differential signal. If we group the power signals into two resultant signals, H and I , and give equal weights to all individual power signals, iYj , then the maximum possible value of the differential signal is
provided that the cryptosystem does not generate any power internally.
To use a simple partition function, the attacker may use only a single bit of the intermediate result of the scalar multiplication. In such cases, instead of choosing a specific bit for all j , H j n À I, an attacker may strengthen the differential signal by dynamically determining the optimal bit to be used as a partitioning function.
An attacker with plenty of resources will probably attempt to strengthen the differential signal by using a partitioning function as complex as possible. For example, the attacker can choose the number of transitions of logic (from 1 to 0 and vice versa). Certain hardware implementation technologies considerably dissipate uneven amounts of power for these two types of transitions. If the average transition activities for a part of the scalar multiplication algorithm is known, the attacker can use it to split the power signals into two groups, which may result in an improved differential signal.
COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST DPA ATTACKS
In this section, we describe three countermeasures to prevent the DPA that an attacker can use in an effort to learn the secret scalar k of the Koblitz curve scalar multiplication k . The underlying principle is that if k is randomly changed each time it is used in the cryptosystem, the averaging out technique used in the DPA would not converge to an identifiable differential signal and the DPA attacks are expected to fail. The main challenge, however, is to change k to pseudorandom values with a reasonable cost and still provide the same .
The countermeasures presented below can be applied separately. However, when they are used together, one can expect to attain higher levels of protection against power analysis attacks.
Key Masking with Localized Operations (KMLO)
For the sake of simplicity, in (4), assume that I (an extension using H is straightforward). Then, using (7) one can write
which shows two different representations of ª2.º This in turn allows the (Edi symbols of k to be replaced in more than one way on a window of three or more symbols. For example, using the above two representations of ª2,º the window of four symbols, viz.,
IS and z Àz. If d i s are allowed to take values outside the range ÀPY P, more combinations can be obtained. These combinations can be used to modify the symbols of the window such that the resultant symbols belong to a set that has as a subset. Note that, for nonoverlapping and fixed sized windows, there are a limited number of combinations that are available to mask a window. For a higher level of security, the windows can be randomly overlapped and their sizes can be randomly changed. These make the KMLO countermeasure resistant against attacks at the window boundaries.
To implement this key-masking scheme in hardware, one can use an n-stage shift register, where each stage can hold one symbol of (see Fig. 4 ). The key k reduced modulo ( n À I is initially loaded into the register. A masking unit will take a w-tuple vector (w ! Q) consisting of any w adjacent symbols from the register and add it to another vector derived from (14) . (For w R, a set of possible vectors are given in (15) .) The resultant vector then replaces the original w-tuple vector in the register. This process is repeated by shifting the contents of the register, possibly to mask all the symbols stored in the register. During this masking process, if a resultant symbol lies outside the set , one can repeatedly apply (14) to restrict the symbol within . Additionally, since
Y IT where i i AE , for H i n À I, and is an integer. Hence, a bias can be applied to each symbol of the key without any long addition (and, hence, without any carry propagation).
Once the key has been masked as described above, the masked key can be used in an SPA resistant algorithm presented earlier to compute the scalar multiplication. Before another scalar multiplication is performed, the masked key stored in the n-stage shift register (refer to Fig. 4) is to be masked again. To prevent a DPA attack, this masking process is repeated before each scalar multiplication.
Random Rotation of Key (RRK)
where r is a random integer such that H r n À I. Using (8), the elliptic curve scalar multiplication can be written as follows:
This leads to the following algorithm, where the operation ª H i X s i H º can be replaced by ª H i X s i À s H I H º if an elliptic addition of y has to be avoided. 
The above algorithm can be mapped onto a hardware structure as shown in Fig. 5 . The secret key is shown to be in a register where each cell can hold any element of . A simple control unit is assumed to generate the random integer r, which is used by the multiplexor (MUX) to select an appropriate symbol from the register. This symbol is used for accessing the look-up table which holds the elliptic curve points s i H , Vi. The point retrieved from the table is added to ( to obtain .
Before starting the iterations, Algorithm 3 computes
where x and y are the coordinates of . Let the normal basis representations of x and y be
respectively. Then, one can write
which correspond to r-fold left cyclic shift of the representations of x and y, respectively. Thus, using a normal basis representation, one can easily compute H ( r with minimal risk of revealing the value of r against power attacks.
On the other hand, if x and y are represented with respect to a polynomial or other basis, where the ( r mapping is accomplished in an iterative way, measures must be taken so that the number of iterations does not reveal r. Toward this effort, the following steps can be used for 
Comparing (20) and (21), one can see that if f I is chosen to nullify the effect of f H , then these two redundant symbols should have the following relationship:
On the other hand, if the pair (f P Y f Q ) is to cancel (f H Y f I ), then the following should be satisfied:
assuming that f P is m positions away from f I . The value of m can be varied. However, for the sake of simpler implementation, it can be fixed to a value which could be as small as unity. A hardware structure for the implementation of Algorithm 4 is shown in Fig. 6 . The loop of the above algorithm requires two extra elliptic curve points to be stored. It also requires the inverse of the ( mapping, which is, however, simple.
Discussions
Here, we first make a few comments on the countermeasures proposed above. Then, we discuss the costs to implement these countermeasures.
Comments
. The three methods presented above use (Edi representation of the key k. The first and the third methods can be extended to other bases of presentation of k and, hence, potentially to other cryptosystems. . Each of the three proposed methods uses a lookup table which holds the precomputed points. The table contents are to be updated each time a new (or H in the random rotation of the key) is used. If the symbol set is symmetric around zero, then the look-up table size can be reduced. This is possible because the negative multiples of can be obtained from the positive multiples using À xY y xY x y . Although, this technique can reduce the table size up to half, it introduces an extra step for the negative digits, which may reveal the signs of the digits unless proper measures are taken to protect them. . Like the SPA countermeasures, the computational complexities of the DPA countermeasures presented above are not affected by the number of nonzero symbols in the reduced (Edi representation of k.
Overheads
The DPA countermeasures presented earlier use key randomization in conjunction with SPA resistant scalar multiplication. Below, we discuss the main costs due to these key randomization schemes.
. In the KMLO scheme, the key is masked w symbols at a time (refer to Fig. 4 ). The masking vectors, which are given in (15) for w R, can be stored in a small look-up table of w symbols wide. For today's resource constrained cryptosystems, each symbol is expected to be of about three bits or so. The KMLO scheme also requires w adders, each capable of adding any two symbols used for the representation of k. Thus, the time complexity of this key randomization scheme can be approximated as y n w . Simple trade-offs between space and time complexities are possible, such as to use only one adder and have a time complexity of yn. . In the RRK scheme, the key k is given an r-fold cyclic shift, where r is a random integer in the range HY n À I. For this purpose, a dlog P ne bit random number generator can be used. If a normal basis is used for representing the elements of qpP n , then RRK does not require any more additional resources. When a polynomial basis is used, one would, however, need Pn extra squaring operations in qpP n corresponding to the n Frobenius mappings used for the secure computation of H ( r . . The random locations of the redundant symbols used in the RIRS scheme can be generated with a dlog P ne bit random number generator. A look-up Fig. 6 is, however, larger by an amount equivalent to the storage space of jj À jj elliptic curve points, where and are the symbol sets discussed in Section 5.3. The value of jj À jj is less than n H and is equal to zero when the redundant symbols belong to . As shown in Fig. 6 , the other overheads for the RIRS scheme include storage space for the redundant symbols, a multiplexer, and an inverse Frobenius mapping unit. The inverse of the Frobenius map corresponds to two square root operations in qpP m and has space and time complexities comparable to the Frobenius map. Overall, the computational overhead for Algorithm 4 is about I n H n times that of Algorithm 2b.
IMPACT ON DIFFERENTIAL SIGNAL
In this section, we discuss the effect of the above three countermeasures on the differential signal of the DPA attack. For the sake of clarity, below we write of (12) as I since it corresponds to the differential signal value as t 3 I. Now, let min be the minimum value of the differential signal needed by the attacker to distinguish (12)). The attacker can obtain this min by running the scalar multiplication operations (and monitoring the power signals), say only t min times. The latter is most likely to be much less than his maximum ability of t le runs. Let us denote le as the value of the differential signal corresponding to t le , such that min le I . When the scalar multiplication operations are equipped with DPA countermeasures, assume that the attacker uses his ability of t le runs to recover the scalar. Let e , f , and g denote the values of the differential signals that the attacker obtains from his DPA attacks on the scalar multiplication operations equipped with countermeasures KMLO, RRK, and RIRS, respectively, described earlier.
Since k mod ( n À I, the KMLO countermeasure is essentially a mapping of the binary scalar to one of many (Edi equivalent scalars. The resultant scalars use a symbol set of size jj and are of n symbols each. We assume that the windows for the masking can be overlapped and their sizes can be varied to various sizes so that the total number of (Edi n-tuples is jj n . Then, each binary scalar can take, on average, jjaP n equivalent (Edi scalars. If the masking operation is random, the differential signal is attenuated by a factor of jjaP n , i.e., e % le jjaP n X
In RRK, the scalar multiplication operation starts from a random symbol position of (Edi representation of . Assuming that the starting position is uniformly distributed over all n positions, the attacker's differential signal is attenuated by a factor of n, i.e., f % le anX As mentioned earlier, the RIRS countermeasure can be implemented at various levels of complexities and these would affect the level of protection against DPA attacks as well as the implementation cost and computation time. Here, we consider a simple version of RIRS based on (23) with m I. Thus, four redundant symbols are grouped together and n H is a multiple of four. In each group, the effect of the first pair is cancelled by the second pair. We pick the first pair from the symbol set . In order to satisfy (23) , the second pair would belong to an extended set , where jj jj. If there is at least one (Edi symbol of in between two groups of redundant symbols, then n H aR n I and each scalar is mapped onto one of the nI n H aR jj P combinations and so is the factor of attenuation of the differential signal and we have
In the above discussions, the effects of the three countermeasures are considered separately. When combined, they contribute to the randomization of the scalar by reducing the differential signal by their respective attenuating factor. Thus, if all three countermeasures are applied together, the differential signal is attenuated by a factor which is equal to the product of the above three attenuation factors, i.e., n R jjaP nP n I n H aR jj P X For practical cryptosystems based on Koblitz curves, one would find n ! ITQ and jj % Q. For these values of n and jj, the differential signal is attenuated to a level which makes the DPA attack infeasible with technologies available today.
COMPARISON
In this section, we briefly compare a number of DPA countermeasures, namely [8] , [7] , and [21] , with those presented in this article. These countermeasures are of similar type in the sense that their resistance depends on the randomization of the secret key.
In the randomization technique of [8] , a multiple of the total number of curve points i is added to k. Since i y,
where e is an integer. The realization of this key randomization scheme requires a large integer multiplier (i is about n bits long). If this multiplier is not already part of the system into which the power analysis resistant elliptic curve scalar multiplication is to be embedded, it will result in a considerable increase in the silicon area. On the other hand, the key masking/randomization scheme presented in Although, the method proposed in [21] focuses on key randomization in modular exponentiation, one can attempt to extend it to elliptic curve scalar multiplication. It starts the computation of at a random symbol of k, but always terminates the computation at the most significant symbol giving the adversary an opportunity to work backward. For such an attack on Koblitz curve-based cryptosystems, the adversary needs to compute the inverse of the ( mapping, which, unlike the square root operation in modular exponentiation, can be quite simple. On the other hand, Algorithm 3 of this article also starts at a random position (i.e., symbol), but, unlike [21] , it terminates adjacent to the random starting position. As a result, it is less vulnerable to the backward power analysis attack.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The security of many public-key cryptosystems depends on the secrecy of the private key. In the recent past, a number of methods have been reported in the open literature to recover the key by analyzing the power consumption of a cryptosystem. If an adversary is successful in obtaining the key, he can impersonate the actual key holder and commit malicious acts. In many applications, the key is stored inside the cryptosystem and appropriate measures are to be taken so that the key is not revealed when a power analysis attack is launched.
This article has considered power analysis attacks on Koblitz curve-based cryptosystems. Algorithmic level countermeasures have been presented for both the SPA and DPA attacks. The proposed SPA resistant schemes rely on making the power consumption for the scalar multiplication independent of the values of the key. Since these schemes also make all the instructions of the scalar multiplication algorithm run, irrespective of the value of the key, they can be potentially extended to the protection against timing attacks.
The DPA resistant schemes proposed in this article rely on the randomization of the key as follows: 1) key masking without a large multiplier, 2) random rotation of the key, and 3) random insertion of redundant symbols in the key. The first scheme reduces the implementation complexity of DPA resistant design by eliminating the need for a very large integer multiplier. Consequently, it also reduces time delays due to carry-propagation inherent to many large multipliers. The second scheme randomly rotates the symbols of the key. The third scheme is the insertion of redundant symbols at random locations of the key making power analysis attacks combined with pattern search infeasible.
When applied to Koblitz curve-based cryptosystems, the above countermeasures are expected to be less complex than the similar ones proposed recently in the open literature. Nevertheless, their overall impacts on the cryptosystems need to be carefully investigated and possible trade-offs are to be identified for implementation in real systems. More importantly, these countermeasures are to be investigated against more advanced attacks. F For more information on this or any computing topic, please visit our Digital Library at http://computer.org/publications/dlib.
